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Canada’s Global Role:
A Strategic Assessment
of its Military Power
JOSEPH R. NUNEZ

T

he comity between Canada and the United States is testimony to the
strength of liberal peace. The Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1818 is still in effect
and has been described as the “longest lasting and most successful disarmament treaty in international history.”1 Canadians do not go to bed worrying if
the United States is going to attack. We have become so interdependent that it
is impossible to see our paths diverging to such a degree that our special relationship is jeopardized. Within the Americas, Canada is the democracy with
which we have the most in common, whether it is history or kinship. In fact,
Canada and the United States are an example of how values and interests can
converge so pervasively that each side takes the other for granted, akin to a
long-married couple. Nevertheless, important political differences are highlighted when administrations emerge from very different political viewpoints, as was the case between Prime Minister Jean Chretien and President
George Bush. Moreover, Canada generally worships at the United Nations altar, whereas the United States is skeptical about the United Nations’ ability to
provide timely and sound handling of global problems. In truth, both positions are somewhat flawed, because one state is trying to use an international
organization to magnify its modest power, while the other state is more eager
to use its superpower status to disengage from slow UN deliberations to craft
its own solutions to security threats.
A major cause of divergent views is the power imbalance between
these two neighbors. On the whole, Canada is a middle-power—it possesses a
great-power economy and a less-than-middle-power military. Its neighbor is
a superpower. This comparative sense of weakness inspires some Canadians
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to complain of US hegemony. Yet this complaint often has more to do with
cultural influence than with economic or political-military dominance. The
Canadian economy continues to grow more vibrantly than its NAFTA partners on a per capita basis, and Canada is a major beneficiary of free trade—the
United States is its number one trading partner.
The two countries also enjoy a long and institutionalized defense
partnership, but it is not without its difficulties. The defense relationship has
been strained for well over a decade, although the cracks in this partnership
did not rise to public attention until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Bluntly stated, Ottawa tolerated a major decline in its military for years while
it signed up for more UN peacekeeping missions than it could adequately
manage.2 Washington was relatively quiet about this martial decline until
homeland security rose as a national security priority, an imperative connected to the Global War on Terror.

Canada’s Place in the World
Canada’s current global conundrum is tied to its identity crisis. Formerly an important player on the world stage, its influence is now greatly diminished. Critics are quick to point out that Canada spends little on its
military, less than $265 per capita, making it last among major North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) members.3 On a Gross National Product (GNP)
basis, Canada spends just 1.1 percent on defense, putting it on par with Liechtenstein.4 One senior Canadian officer described his country’s challenge to
overcome its geostrategic handicap as, “We are a regional power without a region.”5 Ottawa still possesses a measure of global clout through its dynamic
economy. Choices it makes early in the 21st century will have a major impact
on its ability to halt this decline, especially in defense, and to rebuild its
strength and stature within the international system. It is fair to say that Canada is reassessing its future defense direction, scaling back on traditional
peacekeeping commitments, increasing its role in peace enforcement operations, and taking a new look at its security relationship with the United States.
Canadians see themselves as global peacekeepers, and this is reinforced in the Canadian press, vividly displayed on their currency, and echoed
in conversations on the street. But the reality is different from the perception.
Colonel Joseph Nunez is director of theory and war studies in the Department of
National Security and Strategy, US Army War College. He has commanded company and
battalion units in heavy and light divisions, respectively. In 1994 Colonel Nunez served
in Operation Restore/Uphold Democracy (Haiti) with the 10th Mountain Division (Light
Infantry). He is a graduate of St. Lawrence University and holds an M.A. from the University of Virginia, where he is currently a Ph.D. candidate in international relations.
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Using United Nations peacekeeping operations statistics, the Canadian contribution to UN missions is now rather small. Of 92 countries furnishing forces,
Canada ranks 34th, placing it in the middle third. With just 239 service members
deployed, Canada pales in comparison to, say, Pakistan with 5,252 on UN missions. Even within the Americas, Canada is not the largest contributor. Uruguay,
Argentina, and the United States provide more peacekeeping personnel.6
Over the last 15 years, Ottawa has developed a greater hemispheric
orientation, a huge departure from its traditional Euro-centric focus. This
change began after World War II, as Canada moved from the British sphere
to a North American commitment.7 A key challenge for Canada is deciding
between two roles—continuing to support a multitude of UN missions or asserting greater interest in a regional approach to peacekeeping and other operations through hemispheric cooperation.8 Part of the soul-searching is due to
demonstrated difficulties in mustering adequate forces with proper equipment,
not to mention deployment and sustainment. Experts such as Joseph Jockel argue that the country faces hard choices because Canada’s peacekeeping orientation has led to a significant degradation of its combat capability, particularly
its ability to sustain military operations at brigade level.9 This UN peacekeeping orientation began long ago with Canada’s involvement in the Suez Crisis.
In his book, Canada’s Army: Waging the War and Keeping the Peace, author
J. L. Granatstein explains the change in military focus:
At the United Nations on November 1 [1956], Lester Pearson, the Secretary of
State for External Affairs, proposed that the Secretary-General “begin to make
arrangements with Member Governments for a United Nations force large
enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being
worked out. . . . My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian
participation in such a United Nations force.” This idea and Pearson’s subsequent role in creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) won him
the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize. . . . The crisis affected the army in other ways as
well. First, Pearson’s Nobel Prize made Canadians into the world’s leading believers in peacekeeping. Every world crisis after 1956 saw Canadians demanding their troops bring peace to the world.10

The logic of a diminished Canadian military is easy to grasp. Internationally, Canada enjoys the security umbrella afforded by the United States.
Thus, it acts as a free rider and can fund its defense on the cheap. Monies not devoted to defense are used to pay for domestic programs. Probably no single
document illustrates this policy better than the “Speech from the Throne”
given on 30 September 2002, outlining then-Prime Minister Chretien’s vision
for Canada. The international dimension of the speech is less than ten percent
of the text. Moreover, it raises more questions than it answers. There is a pledge
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“to work with its allies to ensure the safety and security of Canadians” and “to
work through organizations such as the United Nations to ensure that the rule
of international law is respected and enforced.”11 It vaguely states that Canada
“will work with the United States to address our shared security needs.”12
Finally, there is a brief allusion to the military:
In the face of rapid change and uncertainty, the government must engage Canadians in a discussion about the role that Canada will play in the world. Before
the end of this mandate, the government will set out a long-term direction on international and defence policy that reflects our values and interests and ensures
that Canada’s military is equipped to fulfill the demands placed upon it.13

Canadian Defense after World War II
Canada long defended itself with militias, not standing armies. It was
not until after World War II that Canada made a strong commitment to a fulltime force. Even so, the government was vague and tentative in its support for
the end-strength originally planned, resulting in an army that was half of what
was promised, and great uncertainty over defense requirements.14 A major part
of that uncertainty revolved around its ascending ally, the United States.
As the Cold War emerged, Canada and the United States became partners in defense, but did not institutionalize this partnership until 1957 with the
creation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
This idea of working together to defend the North American continent dates
back to 1940 when the two executives, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and
President Franklin Roosevelt, met in Ogdensburg, New York, to discuss the
war and common defense challenges. A binational command, NORAD was established in 1958 and headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where it
still is today. The command’s original mission was to provide “operational
control of continental air defenses against the threat of Soviet bombers.”15
The practical effect of the NORAD agreement was that it helped justify the modernization of a Canadian Air Force. It did little to bolster the Canadian Army. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded in 1949, was
more beneficial to Canada’s ground forces. Though obviously more focused
on Europe than North America, NATO provided a reason for Canada to raise
and maintain combat brigades. The Canadian Army’s mettle, and Canada’s
military as a whole, were tested and validated with their participation in the
Korean War, a conflict supported by the United Nations.16
The mid-1950s, however, marked the apex for Canada’s military
strength. After that, two factors served to reduce the nation’s combat capability. The first was Ottawa’s peacekeeping orientation, and the second was the diminishing fear of a Soviet attack. In 1968 Pierre Trudeau ascended as the new
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Liberal Party Prime Minister to further change the military. Under his leadership, Canada reduced its forces in Europe (under NATO) by half. Additionally,
peacekeeping declined in priority.17 During this period Canada’s navy lost its
only aircraft carrier, its army said goodbye to a number of proud regiments, and
its air force was forced to wait another decade to receive new aircraft.18
Canadian forces did not fare much better under Conservative Party
leadership, however. The need to cut budget deficits, coupled with the end of
the Cold War, meant that additional support was not forthcoming, and cutbacks became the order of the day. Further damaging Canada’s military reputation in NATO was the realization that because of declining airlift and sealift
capabilities, Canada could not deploy a brigade with sufficient speed.19 One
Canadian historian refers to the period after 1968 as “professionalism under
siege.”20 The major criticism resounding among various experts on Canadian
military history is that strategically the country traded ends for image, choosing form over substance. It was more important to have a presence than to materially shape the outcome. During this same period, Canada jumped into
every UN peacekeeping operation and maintained its involvement in NATO
and NORAD, albeit with reduced forces and rapidly declining equipment, logistics, and strategic lift, not to mention morale.
In the post-Cold War global environment of growing nationalism and
failed states, the 1990s reflected a growing demand for peacekeepers and
peacemakers. For Canada’s shrinking military, it was a means to an end—
survival. But significant costs arose from this emphasis on peacekeeping. The
military leadership disliked peacekeeping duty because it reduced unit combat
effectiveness. Peacekeeping was antithetical to maintaining the fighting ability
of soldiers because they rarely performed combat tasks. Another problem was
that many missions lasted indefinitely, depriving the military of soldiers
needed to maintain units at home. Additionally, the increasing number of missions, coupled with a smaller military, meant that many peacekeepers would
return from one mission and then soon deploy on another. If you add the declining level of support to these soldiers, it is easy to see how morale declined precipitously. Finally, while Canada perceived itself to be the “world’s moral
superpower,” performing good works, making peace, and advancing human
security, this was a hollow reality.21

Canada’s Security and Defense Posture in the 21st Century
A growing number of Canadians see their country in positive domestic and negative international terms. The economy has been healthy for many
years, affording Canadians a high quality of life and a comprehensive social
welfare system. But beyond the borders the picture is very different, as Andrew Cohen explains:
Autumn 2004

79

The truth is that Canada is in decline in the world today. It is not doing what it
once did, or as much as it once did, or enjoying the success it once did. By three
principal measures—the power of its military, the generosity of its foreign aid,
the quality of its foreign service—it is less effective than a generation ago. . . .
To argue that Canada has abandoned or diluted its traditional roles in the world
isn’t terribly new. The argument has been made in different ways different
times. It is just that now—with the country’s leadership in play, the war on terrorism in train, and the military in eclipse—the sense of loss has become more
acute, gathering a momentum of its own.22

Clearly, the events of 2001 changed Canada’s views about North
American security. They also challenged assumptions about Ottawa’s place in
the world, and the nature of its political, economic, and military relationship
with Washington. Canadian concern grew over the development of a new security architecture for North America. But it should surprise no one that Canadians
are favorably oriented toward increased security cooperation. NORAD provides
a working framework for such cooperation. Historically, Washington and Ottawa worked closely during World War I and II—in fact, Canada jumped into the
fight before the United States, and it was Ottawa that persistently encouraged
Washington to join the war. This cooperation produced a strong defense partnership. The two countries are the only Western Hemisphere members of NATO.
Most Canadians see the US initiative to create Northern Command
through the dilemma that journalist Jim Travers describes as the choice to
“share defense or be tossed aside.”23 Borrowing an analogy from classical literature, Travers describes Canada’s security challenge:
Shocked awake by Sept. 11, Washington, or Gulliver, is not about to be constrained by the petty concerns of the Lilliputians. Canada is the most exposed of
the Lilliputians. Perched precariously along the great undefended cliché and
historically committed to securing America’s back door, [Canada] faces an unambiguous imperative: It can share responsibility for continental defense or it
can be tossed aside as Gulliver stirs.24

Reflected in these choices are concerns about the adequacy of Ottawa’s military, the uneasiness of living next to a superpower, and concern
that Canada might be abandoned if it does not pull its share of the continental
security mission. Others see difficult scenarios. Douglas Bland believes that
terror attacks on the United States changed the important relationship between the two countries. Critical to this change is the huge impact that would
result from Canada not doing its part to cooperate in preventing terrorism
from penetrating the United States from the north. Bland asserts that “Canada faces no greater foreign and defense policy challenge than finding an appropriate and credible way to reassure the United States that Canada can live
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up to the 1938 Roosevelt-Mackenzie King agreement that no attack on the
United States could come through Canadian territory.”25
The good news is that Ottawa is moving more toward Washington on
security and defense matters, while still raising concerns about sovereignty
and consultation. Canada has taken significant steps to improve border security in recognition of the need “to safeguard the Canadian and American homeland.”26 And Michael Kergin, Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, has
remarked, “Like many countries in the world today, the United States is Canada’s primary foreign policy concern . . . without the United States, Canada is
pretty isolated.”27 Canadian and US interests have much more in common—
trade, rule of law, and democracy—than any differences that exist, so it is wise
to join as partners in the war against terrorism.28
John Manley, former Deputy Prime Minister, has argued along the
same lines. A complex set of intersecting issues—border reform, transportation, law enforcement, financial and immigration issues, and security cooperation—challenge Canadians to make what Manley calls “clear and conscious
choices as a nation . . . what we value, what we will seek, what we must
defend—and, ultimately what we are willing to do in order to achieve
these.”29 Acknowledging that sovereignty is an important Canadian concern,
he argues that it “is fundamentally about making choices, and about acting responsibly in the national interest so that we are able to preserve that field of
choice for ourselves . . . [S]overeignty must be dynamic—or else our country
cannot be.”30 Thus, if Canada wants to preserve its favorable situation as the
number one trading partner of the United States, it must get beyond the shrill
rhetoric about “American imperialism,” something present in academic circles and the media.31 Manley recognizes that Ottawa can better preserve
sovereignty by constructively engaging Washington to address bilateral responsibilities as well as benefits—that there is no free lunch. He argues,
“Much of the almost 135-year history of our nation has been about how we
establish and exercise our sovereignty within a shared North American
space—almost always accompanied by ritual fear and anxiety over how a
greater North America might mean a diminished Canada.”32
Until recently, Canada was known for peacekeeping and little else
since World War II, though it did see combat in the Korean War, and some
troops experienced brief combat engagements during peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Croatia. This changed significantly with Canada’s 2001
deployment to Afghanistan. Canadian forces fought well with US forces
against al Qaeda fighters. Even before Canadian soldiers entered the fray,
they were well regarded by American commanders. The US commander in
this particular instance, Colonel Frank Wiercinski, told reporters that because
the Canadian soldiers were well trained, they would be integrated fully into
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his task force. Wiercinski stated, “We want to bring capability that we both
can put together, and by using the best of each. And I think we’ve done that.
They bring capability, not liability, to this fight.”33
Canadian military ability was verified on 14 March 2002, when their
forces engaged in fierce combat during Operation Anaconda. The CanadianAmerican offensive demonstrated the resolve and abilities of both countries. It
was also a historic event, because it had been almost 50 years, dating back to
the Korean War, since a Canadian military force had participated in a ground
offensive.34 The Canadian performance obviously impressed US military commanders, because the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) subsequently was placed in charge of Operation Harpoon, a mission to flush
enemy fighters from mountainous caves.35
While there is no question that Canadian soldiers are of high quality
and add real value to any operation, there are many concerns about the quality
of their equipment, logistical support, air and sealift, and their ability to conduct operations above the battalion level. These concerns, though often raised
by allies such as the United States, ring truer when voiced by Canadian officers.36 Afghanistan is a perfect example. The deployment of the 3 PPCLI was
a difficult and frustrating process. Once in Afghanistan, the commander requested a third rifle company to make the unit fully functional and interoperable. Peacekeeping experiences from the 1990s actually constrained the
unit to the point of embarrassment, and the 3 PPCLI was forced to quickly
change to more robust rules of engagement. When reflecting on the quality of
provisioning afforded to his soldiers, and comparing it to how the Americans
were supported, the Canadian commander stated that his unit felt like “sorry
second cousins.”37
On the positive side, the 3 PPCLI brought unique capabilities that
contributed to mission success. For example, the Canadian armored reconnaissance vehicles, called Coyotes, afforded mobility and protection, while
their .50-caliber sniper rifles added accurate long-range effect. The commander stated that the combining of different cultures actually served to create a force multiplier.38 The two units learned from each other, and brought
unique experiences and expertise that benefited all. In short, the sum was
truly greater than the parts. For example, the Canadian troops were experts at
cold-weather operations and very skilled in their ability to influence community attitudes in the local villages. On the other hand, the Americans afforded
the 3 PPCLI an opportunity to participate in the first combat air assault in Canadian history, and provided a good deal of logistical support for common
classes of supply. Canadian soldiers and their commanders understand that in
more cases than not, they will be joining instead of leading campaigns. That
mindset alone is valuable for combined or multinational operations. In the
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first deployment to Afghanistan, the Canadians furnished a battle group that
was integrated within an American brigade.
The United States expected 3 PPCLI to remain longer in Afghanistan, but Canada pulled the unit back after six months. Another disappointment was Canada’s refusal to join the “coalition of the willing” for the
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ottawa was troubled that Washington did not receive
UN Security Council support for its decision to go to war against Baghdad,
even though it agreed with the Bush Administration that there was justification to end the regime of Saddam Hussein. In the end, Ottawa mended fences
with Washington by returning to Afghanistan in 2003 with 2,000 troops and
provided the commanding general of the operation.39

Political and Military Soul-Searching
The 21st century has not been internationally kind to Canada so far,
save for trade. Diplomacy and defense have been in decline for a number of
years. Since 2001, Canada has been forced to reconsider its relationship with
the United States, its place in North America, in the Americas, and in the
world. The Liberal Party, in power for the vast majority of the past four decades, is very popular in Canada because of its success in running the economy and providing an extensive social security network. It is not a favorite of
the military, though officers are not likely to complain because of their strong
ethos of subordination to civilian democratic authority. But there is little
doubt that they feel betrayed by their political masters. This is evident in official military documents. When reflecting on the state of the land forces, the
army’s strategy report stated:
Physical infrastructure is poor and deteriorating in some areas. The Army is
facing significant shortfalls in firepower (both direct and indirect) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. On the personnel side, the burden of incremental taskings imposed by
cuts, establishments, additions (announced in The 1994 White Paper) and a
continual high personnel tempo are taking too great a toll on many soldiers.
There has been an excessive draw on our pool of Reservists to compensate for
gaps in the Regular Force structure. Command and control (C2) is stretched
due to staff cuts and heavy demands of new strategic initiatives. Collective
training opportunities are inadequate to maintain formation-level combat capability, and we are experiencing serious skill fade in some areas. Finally, there is
concern over the morale of the Army. There is a sense of uncertainty and, not insignificantly, a sense of mistrust of the senior leadership caused by constant
change. A lack of unity in thought, purpose, and action is too often apparent.40

Canadian forces underwent significant transformation over the last decade, but it was neither by design nor positive. Units have been withdrawn from
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Europe. They have been forced to deploy on a multitude of difficult missions under declining budgets. Much of their equipment is outdated, ragged, shabby, or
simply not available.41 Units have been mothballed, never to return, but requirements are on the rise. The military is suffering from “cultural upheaval.”42
The quality and size of the forces that a country can muster and deploy on global missions have a huge impact on its international standing.
Trade is also an important measure of a country’s place in the world, of
course, but military force and trade are related, particularly given Canada’s
interdependency with the United States on security and exports. Now that
trade is in danger. For years there seemed to be no domestic price to pay for
letting the military fade, while perpetuating the myth of Canada as the great
peacekeeper. But in the age of terror, Ottawa has good reason to change its
course regarding military support.43
Canada used to take pride for being able to “punch above its weight.”
Now it punches below its weight, causing many businessmen to fear for the future.44 While the United States and Canada are both liberal democracies, enduring allies, strong trading partners, and culturally related, the security threats of
this new age place additional burdens on the liberal community of states to
stand and fight against non-state actors—sometimes aided by rogue and failing
states—that employ terror, transnational crime, and globalized communications to threaten democracies. Ottawa can no longer offer glittering platitudes
and then duck out when the global work must be done and the bills come due.45
It may be a cliché, but freedom is not free, and neither is trade, at least not the
generation or maintenance of it. To keep a global economic system functioning, democratic states must be willing to deter and defeat forces that threaten
their way of life. Canadians are beginning to understand that they are way overdue in their payments, and must rapidly recapitalize defense assets to meet the
burgeoning demands of today and tomorrow.
There is also a realization that Canada can no longer depend on
NATO or the UN to advance Canadian values or provide a “soft balance”46
against its powerful and assertive neighbor. Like it or not, Canada has cast its
future with the United States. Yet, while Ottawa may first consider the Washington perspective, that does not imply subservience to its superpower neighbor. Canada can (and does) say no (or yes) when that is warranted in terms of
Canadian values and interests. The Iraq war of 2003 is a good example of this,
and so is the Afghanistan stabilization mission. Canada made a strong contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan because it was a US initiative
that was given multilateral legitimacy by NATO and the UN. Already, Canada is exhorting its NATO partners to take on a greater role in furnishing
troops, and this is in no small part due to the fact that Ottawa is straining to
maintain its commitment over time.47
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“Canada’s peacekeeping orientation has led to a
significant degradation of its combat capability.”

Another important part of this political-military soul-searching is
homeland and hemispheric security cooperation, and the two are related.48 As
Canada reduced its commitment to Europe, it increased its commitment to
North America and the Western Hemisphere.49 Since the early 1990s, Ottawa
has sought greater engagement, trying to make up for lost time when it saw itself more as an extension of Europe. The creation of NAFTA in 1994 set a
course that forced Canada to expand its strategic focus on North America.
Where NORAD and other agreements provided a cooperative-defense mindset, the free trade agreement cemented the strategic orientation, and this is
largely due to the fact that Canada, above all else, is a trading nation.50 Its vibrant economy depends upon the large export sector.
Security scholars are increasingly focused on the concept of “trilateral security.”51 Concepts like security perimeter, security community, and
continental security are now common terms in government, academia, and
policy institutes. While these are still largely ideas, rather than implemented,
they are discussed in terms that are moving deliberately in that direction.52
The military cooperation piece is particularly noteworthy. Canada’s membership in hemispheric forums includes the Defense Ministerials of the Americas (DMA), the Inter-American Naval Conference (IANC), the Conference
of the Armies of the Americas (CAA), the System for Co-operation Among
the Air Forces of the Americas (SICOFAA), and the hemispheric-wide reporting on Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs).53
In the fall of 2003, Canada hosted the 25th Commanders Conference
of the CAA. This provided an opportunity to foster continued integration, increase the exchange of defense-related information, expand collaboration
among American armies, create unity, strengthen inter-American friendships,
and demonstrate Canadian leadership within the Americas.54 Lieutenant General Rick Hillier, CAA President and Canadian Army Commander, emphasized the need to work together because “no one country alone can meet all the
challenges in providing that basic security,” which he argued was the mutually
reinforcing relationship between human security and the security of the state.55
In the summer of 2002, Canada joined the Inter-American Defense
Board (IADB). This is an international defense and security organization that
promotes cooperative security interests in the Western Hemisphere and operAutumn 2004

85

ates under the authority of the Organization of American States (OAS). In the
short time it has been a member, Canada has demonstrated its leadership
value through the actions of its senior member on the IADB, Rear Admiral
Ian Mack.56 This expansion within the Americas is consistent with Canadian
values and interests. Since the 1980s Canada has participated in a number of
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions. At the same time, Canada’s trade within the Americas has grown at a rapid rate.
The creation of US Northern Command in 2002 prompted Ottawa to
study the possibility of greater military cooperation. Given that the command’s
area of responsibility includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico—the
members of NAFTA—it was logical to find a way to engage constructively.
The Binational Planning Group serves this purpose. It provides Canada a
bridge from NORAD to NORTHCOM. In typical Canadian fashion, the process is slow, methodical, and concerned about the preservation of sovereignty.
Despite this largely bureaucratic obstacle to increased security cooperation,
however, the actions of assigned officers have been positive and reflect a high
level of mutual respect, innovation, and professionalism.57 In particular, one
area of homeland defense directly benefitting from this collaboration is naval
cooperation between Canada and the United States, which bolstered the security of both countries’ coastlines and ports. Given their nature and manner of
deployment, along with their mutual reinforcing actions that have enhanced
interoperability, the two nations’ sea services are more disposed toward cooperation; thus, it is a good model for the two armies to emulate.58

The Way Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities
The Canada that Prime Minister Paul Martin now leads is moving further away from the United States culturally, and that has significant implications
for economic, political, and military cooperation.59 Ottawa is at an important
crossroads that will determine its future direction in this new century. There has
always been latent anti-Americanism in Canada. Historical differences—loyal
colonials versus revolutionaries—and asymmetries of power underscore elements of distrust and dislike that are ever-present to one degree or another.60 That
is not to say that the relations between these two neighbors are rocky. In fact,
since 11 September 2001 Canada has cooperated very closely with the United
States to improve border controls, share intelligence, and track down terrorists.61
A huge challenge for Prime Minister Martin is to find a path midway
between shrill defiance and fawning lockstep accommodation of the United
States. Thumbing your nose at Uncle Sam, aside from poisoning relations,
also serves to fan the flames of anti-Americanism, and this damages Ottawa’s
long-term interests. Rolling over for Washington makes Canada look weak
and either unable to set its own course or unwilling to offer an alternative. On
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top of this, Canada should refrain from the temptation to act as the moral superior in the partnership, taking the “role of provider of wise counsel.”62 Such
a haughty position is unwarranted, particularly considering Canadian words
versus deeds.63 If it is necessary to advise, do it privately. Remembering Canada’s positive influence on the US entry in World Wars I and II, and Canada’s
willingness to make large commitments to back its moral position, should
serve as constructive examples of how it can best influence US behavior.
If the business view of government is negative, it is much worse
when it comes to diplomacy and the military, key components of foreign policy. Prime Minister Chretien’s Achilles’heel was foreign policy. Canadian influence around the world declined during his tenure, and that is not just an
American view.64 More than an infusion of funds, many institutions require
new leadership and strategies. And this leadership and strategic vision must
come from the top.
There is little doubt that Paul Martin can lead Canada in a new direction within North America, the Western Hemisphere, and the world. His remarks, even before he assumed the leadership mantle, indicate that he clearly
understands his environment and that major foreign policy change is afoot:
Our bilateral relations must be conducted on a far more sophisticated basis. Our
goal must be to keep our two nations open to each other. . . . The absence of consensus in the U.N. should not condemn us to inaction. Multilateralism, after all,
is a means not an end.65

One of Martin’s most daunting challenges is to navigate his way
through the government’s bureaucratic maze to develop and implement a national security strategy. Canada’s foreign policy has remained basically unchanged for nearly a decade. The government’s last foreign policy white
paper was published in 1995 and the last defense policy review in 1994. Even
in tandem, these do not constitute a grand strategy. Aside from now being
grossly out of date, these documents did little to link political, economic, and
military elements of power in support of Canadian values and interests.
Outside observers often are puzzled as to why Canada does not have
a national security strategy or an interagency process to coherently support its
implementation. A close look at domestic and international factors provides
some answers. As a country, Canada’s internal stability depends upon keeping its various provinces—particularly Quebec—happy, and that is no easy
task. There is no unitary political culture, and Alberta and Quebec are polar
opposites on the political spectrum. Given these major cleavages, it is risky to
articulate a national security strategy because many Canadians are likely to
object. Furthermore, setting a strategic course entails costs. The national budget must apply resources to support strategic ends, such as providing for a
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strong military to prevent war and promote peace. And if more dollars go toward defense, then popular domestic programs might suffer cuts.
The international reasons for refraining from delineating a national
security strategy are also significant. Canada is not an independent actor in
the international state system. Thus, any strategy must acknowledge that Ottawa does not control its own destiny, whether it is the defense of the country
or the deployment of force to promote its human security agenda. Defense of
the Canadian homeland is dependent upon major US assistance. Canadian
heralding of multilateralism is more than high-minded liberal internationalism; it is also a practical means of executing thrifty globalism. If this illusion
of complete sovereignty and robust international action is credible, it allows
Canada to focus on domestic priorities while still promoting international
trade. It is also a safe agenda. Since the Canadian military cannot be deployed
or employed independently and in significant numbers around the world, it
keeps the government from taking decisive action that might be unpopular at
home or in other countries. In fact, this is an insurance policy against making
a bad call on unilateral intervention.66 From the waning years of the Cold War
until 2001, this approach worked for Ottawa, even if it was writing defense
checks that it knew were going to bounce, eventually.
Prime Minister Martin is more strategically oriented than his predecessor. Just looking at defense, there are many good signs. His choice of David
Pratt to serve as Defence Minister was a bold move for several reasons. Pratt
bucked the conventional Liberal view by supporting Canadian intervention—
with the United States—in Iraq. He has always supported the military, whether
with regard to funding, new equipment, morale, or training.67 Finally, Pratt is a
strategic thinker who has some interesting ideas on security cooperation with
the United States.68 Unfortunately, Pratt lost his seat in Parliament in the June
2004 election, and thus must step down as Defence Minister. One hopes the
Prime Minister will select a like-minded replacement.
After his election as Prime Minister, Martin’s first visit was to the
Department of National Defence (DND), sending a strong message of support. The impact was particularly significant since Prime Minister Chretien
had declined to visit the DND during his decade of leadership. Martin
thanked the men and women in uniform for their work at home and overseas,
and then went on to address the challenges of the new century:
With the end of the Cold War has come a different kind of international conflict,
a different kind of trauma. No nation can isolate itself from the perils and trials,
the tribulations that the world goes through. Our capacity as a nation to respond
on behalf of the world community is very heavily dependent upon the men and
women of our armed services.69
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One officer at Martin’s speech stated hopefully, “We want to believe him; we
want to believe that he does realize that in order to achieve a lot of his goals,
such as putting Canada back on the world stage, . . . he can’t do it with the state
of the military he has now.”70
If actions speak louder than words, then Martin is sending a strong
message to the military. After his speech, he followed up by approving Pratt’s
urgent request to immediately fund new helicopters to replace the aging Sea
Kings, despite a freeze in new federal spending.71 Further bolstering Martin’s
position as a leader for positive change were initiatives to reform the structure
of government to provide for greater domestic security and to improve relations with the United States.72 To achieve strategic ends he is readdressing the
means, by refocusing on structure and resources; soon the policies will follow
that provide the ways. The biggest challenge is to provide enough resources
to bolster the military. For example, the new helicopters will not begin to appear for another four or five years. What is worse is that calculations of equipment life-cycles did not take into consideration the toll that frequent and
difficult operations, like Afghanistan, have exacted on materiel.73

Conclusions
Canada has an important role to play in North America, the Americas, and the world. The nexus of trade and security imperatives place it firmly
within North America. The Canadian role in the Americas is growing in terms
of economic and defense matters. Globally, Canada is challenged to regain its
stature as a country that is willing and able to punch above its weight. Key to
this is the regeneration of the Canadian forces, who have been asked to do too
many missions with too few resources for far too long.
Whether Canadians like it or not, Canada’s political, economic, and
military power is in no small measure dependent upon the United States. As
liberal states, interdependent neighbors, and allies, the two nations share a relationship that is positive overall. Canadians enjoy a high standard of living because they are an industrious people and thrive on their many exports to the
United States, which remains their largest trading partner. Moreover, potential
enemies are deterred from attacking Canada because its superpower neighbor
would not stand for that. Canada has 11 percent of the population of the United
States, yet it has a military only about 3.75 percent the size of its neighbor’s. In
budgetary terms, Ottawa spends 2.6 percent of what Washington spends on defense.74 Canada has neglected its military for a long time because of the impressive security umbrella afforded by the United States, but this cannot continue
given the terrorist challenges that threaten established democracies.
Even before 2001, Canada was out of synch in its global vision. Ottawa’s peacekeeping orientation was no match for failed states and terrorism.
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While soft power may be an effective foreign policy approach in this millennium, it is largely ineffective without significant hard power to back it up. And
the truth is that today Canada has little hard power. A country that cannot muster and deploy even one self-sufficient brigade to global hot spots is not going
to be taken very seriously, and is certainly not a middle power by military measure. The upshot of this is that Canadian concerns about sovereignty over their
US relationship require serious reevaluation. The ironic verity is that Ottawa
can increase its sovereignty only by working more closely with Washington.
This is not to say that it should march exactly to the Pentagon’s tune. The most
effective strategy is to cooperate when cooperation aligns with Canadian values and interests. This also requires a great deal of diplomacy, especially since
Washington tends to take Ottawa for granted. When Ottawa must disagree, it
should quickly make its case with Washington, but in a discreet manner. It also
would be helpful if Canada would produce a national security strategy that
clearly articulates what the nation wishes to achieve internationally, and which
provides the plans and resources to achieve it.75 The new leadership appears to
be moving in this direction.
In concrete terms, it is certainly wise for Canada to further institutionalize its partnership with the United States in defense of North America. Joining Northern Command would accomplish this, particularly since
NORAD is decreasing in importance.76 Of course, Ottawa should insist on a
sovereignty clause, a guarantee that Canadian troops will not be deployed on
any mission without the express approval of the Canadian government.
Formally joining Northern Command, just as Canada did with NORAD,
would confirm that the relationship between Canada and the United States is a
model of liberal interdependency suitable for emulation. Democracy, capitalism, and security cooperation can keep the neighboring states strong and successful allies. Ottawa clearly benefits by working closer in defense matters
with Washington—it can gain significant improvements in training, lift, logistics, and technology, not to mention respect. These benefits will enable the
country to quickly deploy a well-trained and equipped military force to global
hot spots and sustain them properly. Additionally, such cooperation demonstrates that Canada can provide valuable leadership in the Americas. But Ottawa should understand that Washington needs competent allies—ones that
possess a modicum of hard power.
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